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Wrongful Death Acts Compared Briefly
Robert J. Sawyer*
T HE RIGHT OF ACTION FOR WRONGFUL DEATH was not seriously
considered by the common law courts until 1846. It has not
been given protection by most of our state constitutions despite
the fact that the Federal Constitution has guaranteed life, liberty,
and the pursuit of happiness. However, most states have enacted
"Wrongful Death" statutes to allow protection to their inhabit-
ants.
In order for the next of kin to recover damages in a Wrong-
ful Death action, there must be shown a relationship to the de-
ceased. The fact must be established that there was an interest
akin to insurable interest in the deceased, which has been lost.
Therefore in order to recover damages in a death action, under
most statutes, proof of dependency is not necessary.'
In order to view the problem more systematically the chart
set forth below has been provided.
In it we find that a right of action for "Wrongful Death" in
most states is limited to the personal representative or executor
of the deceased. That representative acts as agent and quasi-
trustee. The personal representative may be said to act as agent
by legislative appointment, for the effectuation of the purpose of
the statute. It gives a right of action to him; and upon recovery
he acts as quasi-trustee for those who stand in the position of
distributees. However, sole beneficiaries often may compromise
before an administrator is appointed, though not usually after-
ward, and thus prevent him from suing. Once the personal rep-
resentative begins his suit, no agreement between the bene-
ficiaries and wrongdoer can thwart the action of the representa-
tive.2
* A second-year student at Cleveland-Marshall Law School, and a grad-
uate of Central State College and Ohio State University.
1 Novak v. Chicago and Calumet Dist. Transit Co., 135 N. E. 2d 1 (Ind.,
1956) superseding 127 N. E. 2d 116; Burn's Ann. St. Ind. Sec. 2-404; Carianni
v. Schwenker, 118 A. 2d 847 (N. J., 1955); Smollin v. Wilson, 74 So. 2d 685
(Fla., 1954).
2 Kennedy v. Davis, 55 S. 104 (Ala., 1911); Irwin v. Alabama Fuel Co.,
110 S. 566 (Ala., 1925); Hampton v. Roberson, 163 S. 644 (Ala., 1935);
Fischer v. Pope, 155 S. 579 (Ala., 1934); Story v. Page, 273 N. W. 384
(Mich., 1937); Fetty v. Carroll, 190 S. E. 683 (W. Va., 1937).
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It may be observed that in most states a right of action rests
only in the representative. He stands in the shoes of the deceased,
and maintains a right of action owned by the deceased if he had
lived. As a result of thus standing in the shoes of the deceased,
the representative is subject to the defenses which would have
been available against the decedent. 3
While the rulings and tenor of the majority of cases closely
follow the above principle, it seems significant that, while the
action must be brought by the personal representative, it is
also quite possible for the personal representative to act in his
individual capacity. If he acts as an individual, the funds may
not be distributed properly. The general feeling is that to deny
to the heirs or next of kin the right to bring suit, in effect would
deny just distribution of the personal estate of the deceased.
There are other situations in which the beneficiaries may
bring action where the executor or administrator fails to do so.
An example of this would be where the administrator had admin-
istered the estate to final settlement without prosecuting the
claim for Wrongful Death. Another instance would be where
there had been collusion between the appointed administrator
and the wrongdoer in order that the wrongdoer could escape lia-
bility. In such an eventuality, the widow, if any, or the heirs at
law may maintain the action, by making the administrator a party
defendant. 4
It is also worth noting that generally the states' death stat-
utes prohibit recovery for pain and suffering, where it can be
established that death was instantaneous. This is explained by
the fact that there must be a cause of action on that count. The
personal representative cannot bring an action on that score, for
the estate, where it is shown that death was instantaneous. In
order to allow a recovery for pain and suffering, death must be
preceded by a period of conscious suffering. 5
The Statute of Limitations for such cause is generally two
years, and is strictly construed. Lack of sufficient evidence, fail-
ure in the appointment of an administrator, and ignorance of the
law, have been held to be insufficient excuses for not bringing
3 McFadden v. May, 189 A. 483 (Penna., 1937); Hames v. City of NewYork, 54 N. Y. S. 2d 289, 64 N. E. 2d 449 (N. Y., 1945); Handley v. City ofHope, 137 F. Supp. 442 (Ark., 1956); Beck v. Groe, 70 N. W. 2d 886 (Minn.,
1955).
4 Alabama Co. v. Brown (92 S. 490) (Ala., 1921); Kent v. Kansas Power
and Light Co., 123 F. Supp. 662 (Kans., 1954).
5 Neuser v. Thelen, 244 N. W. 801 (Wisc., 1932).
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action as specified. 6 The fundamental reason for this strictness
lies in the nature and origin of the cause of action. It is a cause
of action based on a statute in derogation of the common law.
The amount of damages for Wrongful Death, as we can ob-
serve from the chart, in some states is not considered to be com-
pensatory. The purpose of the grant of the right of action by the
Legislature was intended for the preservation of human life, re-
gardless of the pecuniary value of a particular life to the next of
kin. Primarily, evidence tending to show actual pecuniary loss
usually is admissible and relevant. Or measure must be made
by reference to the quality of the wrongful act, and the degree
of culpability.7 Hence, evidence tending to show loss of serv-
ices by those dependent upon the deceased is deemed to be
irrelevant in some states, though not in all. The majority view is
based upon the thought that the heirs of the deceased should be
placed in the same position, as far as this can be done by a money
award, as if the death had not occurred.
In contrast to the minority view and weight of authority,
there are many states that allow damages to be measured by the
probable accumulation of income of the deceased during his life
expectancy.8 And yet there are states holding that, in an action
by a parent for the negligent killing of a child, the damages
awarded must be founded on pecuniary loss, actual or expected.
Mere injury to feelings cannot be considered. Nor can a parent
be entitled to damages for the loss of a child's services, in some
views. But a child can recover for the loss of benefits of instruc-
tion and physical, moral and intellectual training of a deceased
parent. 9 Though the action is brought by the personal repre-
sentative, it usually must be for the exclusive benefit of the next
of kin.
6 Best v. Kinston, 10 S. E. 997 (No. Car., 1890); Hardtner v. Aetna Gas
and Surety Co., 189 S. 365 (La., 1939).
7 Buckalew v. Tenn. Coal, etc., 20 S. 606 (Ala., 1896); Nelson v. Charles-
ton and W. C. Ry. Co., 86 S. E. 2d 56 (So. Car., 1955); Legel v. New Haven
G. Light Co., 111 A. 2d 547 (Conn., 1955); McKirdy v. Cascio, 111 A. 2d
555 (Conn., 1955); New York Central Railroad Co. v. Johnson, 127 N. E. 2d
603 (Ind., 1955); Texas and N. 0. R. Co. v. Hanson, 271 S. W. 2d 309 (Ark.,
1954).
8 Arizona Binghampton Cooper Co. v. Dickson, 195 P. 538 (Ariz., 1921),
44 A. L. R. 881; Wing v. Deppe, 70 N. W. 2d 6 (Wis., 1955); Bailey v.
Spindler, 74 N. W. 2d 344 (Nebr., 1956); Geier v. Tjoden, 74 N. W. 2d 361
(N. D., 1955); Cook v. Knox, 273 P. 2d 865 (Okla., 1954).
9 Interurban R. Co. v. Troiner, 233 S. W. 816 (Ark., 1921); In re Pridell's
Estate, 133 N. Y. S. 2d 203 (N. Y., 1954).
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In an action for Wrongful Death arising out of an automobile
collision, for example, it has been held that instructions on dam-
ages are erroneous if they emphasize the idea that the sole pur-
pose and object of the death statute is to allow damages solely to
those who might reasonably look to the decedent for support.
In the same kind of action it has also been held that instruc-
tions as to damages, which limit any award to the mother of the
decedent, are erroneous when the decedent left also a father,
brother, and sister of the half blood. This is because instructions
should mention all the several persons within the designated
class who are entitled to be considered.
Where action is brought under the death statute, instructions
on damages were held to be erroneous when they directed that if
the plaintiff was entitled to recover, the jury should find the
pecuniary loss sustained by the decedent's mother, fixing such
sum as would equal the probable earnings of the deceased. This
is because such instructions required the jury to find a sum equal
to the probable earnings of the decedent (but, "fixing such sum
with reference to the probable earnings of deceased" would have
been proper). 10
It is obvious that each state sets its own qualification rules.
But the substance of most state statutes seems to be the same
except in details.
10 Wolf v. Lockhart, 78 S. E. 2d 654 (Va., 1953).
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A Comparison of the States' Limitations
in Wrongful Death Statutes.
P-Punitive Damages allowed; P. R.-Personal Representative;
C=Compensatory Damages allowed.
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of
Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Maximum Character Who May
Recovery of Recovery Bring Action
P.R.
No Limit P "Only"
Next of
$10,000 C kin
No Limit C P.R.
No Limit C P. R.
No Limit P P. R.
Next of
$10,000 C kin
No Limit P P. R.
No Limit C P.R.
No Limit C
No Limit C
No Limit
No Limit
No Limit
$25,000
$15,000
No Limit
$25,000
No Limit
No Limit
$10,000
No Limit
Based on de-
gree of culpa-
bility. Con-
scious suffer-
ing recovery
unlimited
No Limit
$17,500
No Limit
$25,000
P.R.
P.R.
Next of
kin
P.R.
P.R.
P.R.
P.R.
P.R.
P.R.
P.R.
P.R.
P.R.
State
C P.R.
P.R.
P.R.
P.R.
P.R.
Statute of
Limitations
2 years
2 years
2 years
2 years
1 year
2 years
1 year
3 years
I year
2 years
years
years
years
year
years
years
years
year
year
years
months
2 years
years
years
years
year
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State
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Puerto Rico
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Maximum Character Who May
Recovery of Recovery Bring Action
No Limit C P. R.
No Limit P P. R.
No Limit C P. R.
$7,500 P P. R.
No Limit P P. R.
No Limit C P. R.
No Limit P P. R.
No Limit C P. R.
No Limit C P. R.
No Limit C P. R.
No Limit C P.R.
$20,000 C P. R.
Next of
No Limit C kin
(Priority)
No Limit
$25,000
No Limit
$20,000
No Limit
No Limit
No Limit
No Limit
$25,000
No Limit
$20,000
$15,000 Pec.
loss, + $2,500
loss of society
No Limit
C
P
P
P
C
C
P
C
1E
P.R.
P.R.
P.R.
P.R.
P.R.
P.R.
P.R.
P.R.
P.R.
P.R.
P.R.
P.R.
C P.R.
Statute of
Limitations
3 years
2 years
2 years
2 years
2 years
3 years
2 years
2 years
2 years
2 years
2 years
2 years
1 year
(P. R. must
sue within
6 months)
1 year
2 years
6 years
(Generally)
3 years
1 year
2 years
2 years
2 years
1 year
3 years
2 years
2 years
Wyoming 2 years
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